

LIBRO VERDE

SCRIVIAMO INSIEME IL FUTURO DELL'EUROPA

UN PROGETTO, UN METODO E UN'AGENDA COSTITUENTE
PER LA DECIMA LEGISLATURA 2024-2029



Green book in view of the tenth European elections
6-9 June 2024

Table of Contents

- Methodological Premise 3-4
- Introduction 5-7
- I. What is at Stake in the Tenth European Elections 7
- II. The Legacy of the Ninth European Legislature 8-11
- III. European Public Goods 11-14
- IV. The Fiscal Capacity of the European Union 14-20
- V. The Unfinished Europe 20-42
- VI. Why and How to Change the European Union 42-43
- VII. The Future of Europe as Written by the Youth 44-51
- VIII. Our Priorities in Summary 52-53

Appendix:

- Manifesto for the European Elections 2024 - European Movement International
- ATTACHMENTS

Rome, 1st March 2024

Methodological premise

This Green Book is aimed at opening a public debate to then translate into a White Book with precise proposals addressed to the new European Parliament and initiatives of citizens addressed to the new European Commission within the framework of the actions and priorities of the International European Movement.

It fits into the debate on the fate of European integration subjected to the dramatic challenges that have rocked the Continent and neighbouring countries in the second decade of the century, taking as its starting point the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe and the reactions from European institutions, together with the indications that emerged from the Italian debate and from representative organizations of civil society after the end of the Conference.

The European Movement intends to share the Green Book with other civil society networks, engage in discussions with research and proposals such as those of the Inequalities Diversity Forum (FDD) in the book *“Which Europe: Understanding, Discussing, Choosing”* and the University Association of European Studies (AUSE), disseminate it through our territorial coordination centres and then submit it to the candidates for the European elections.

The Green Book concludes with a summary of our priorities *“for a united and democratic Europe in a world paralyzed by global disorder.”*

In drafting the Green Book, the European Movement started from three considerations:

- the observation of the provisional and emergency nature of the most relevant policies adopted in recent years by European institutions and national governments, policies that due to their nature have not allowed the European Union to emerge from what has been called a *permacrisis*.
- the inadequacy of a European system based on the Treaty signed in Lisbon in December 2007, the result of an intergovernmental compromise after the decision to abandon the Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome on October 29, 2004.
- the belief that the growth of critical movements towards the European Union lies as much in the fragmentation and institutional fragility of the proposed solutions as in attributing to the European Union responsibilities that belong to the Member States and that the path of national sovereignties is a dangerous illusion destined to render insignificant the role of the "old" Continent. The European Union would thus still be subordinate to old and new powers, with policies distant from the values and principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The alternative to disintegration must instead be based on more integration and therefore on the sharing of sovereignty, making possible and facilitating the full deployment of common policies and the benefits that derive from collective actions, the result of converging actions of all actors animating the same European public space.

The Green Book therefore represents for the European Movement a study on the priorities that should be taken into account in the tenth European legislature; and it is a work in progress to be updated taking into account the results of the European elections, to be used as an action tool in light of the opening of a phase that will inevitably constitute a new Europe.

In writing the Green Book, we have adopted this consideration as our compass: the conclusion of the tenth European legislature will coincide with the eve of the deadline set in the United Nations Agenda 2030 for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and with a new historic step forward on the path of the peaceful and democratic unification of the Continent envisaged as early as 1941 in the "Ventotene Manifesto".

The process of unification requires a close relationship between the enlargement of the European Union (enlarging) and its deepening (deepening) with full involvement of all the societies belonging to the Member States and candidate countries, it being evident that the reforms will concern both the European Union and the new members and that the transition to the new Europe could necessitate new forms of differentiated integration, building together a new political synthesis.

We have decided to introduce the Green Book with what President Sergio Mattarella stated in his speech on December 18, 2023, to Italian ambassadors. He stated:

"In a reality marked by destabilizing forces and the strengthening of major global actors, the political space for the exercise of effective shared sovereignty, encompassing the values and interests of the Italian Republic, lies within the European Union, which by its very nature must evolve to avoid regression. Today more than ever, we have the duty to relaunch the integration process by strengthening its governance mechanisms. Like any human endeavour, the European Union is not perfect: it is an ongoing construction site, requiring daily shoring up through the efforts of all, combining resilience, firm clarity, and patience. It is a construction site to be completed in its architecture, as a partial structure cannot hold for too long."

And he continued:

"We will be part of that great exercise of popular sovereignty represented by the election of the European Parliament, followed by the appointment of the new European Commission."

Introduction

The upheavals and devastations ongoing in the international system - in what Timothy Garton Ash has termed an "*à la carte world*" - compel the European Union, and with it Italy, to redefine their international positioning across all dimensions: democratic, political, economic, social, security, environmental, and cultural.

There have recently been risks of setbacks in the European integration process, but also untapped potentials.

It is no coincidence that Jean Monnet argued that Europe's integration process would find ways to materialize through crises and would result from the responses it could provide to such crises. However, the community system has not always been able to provide adequate responses to crises. It is hoped that the European Union and its member states - aware of the seriousness of the situation - will do better than in the past.

A cycle characterized by globalization with unregulated liberal policies and the longest and deepest economic and social crisis the world has ever experienced has long since ended.

The entire planet is affected by processes that, in an increasingly interdependent manner and with growing speed, challenge its geopolitical framework and exacerbate social imbalances:

- From those concerning finance and currencies to their impact on the economy and social structure,
- From the growth of the world population to the desperate migrations of its weakest parts,
- From excessive consumption of non-renewable natural resources to environmental degradation,
- From the improvement of welfare conditions and wealth for a minimal part of the world's populations to the plunge into increasing poverty, hunger, and disease for the majority,
- From the violent resurgence of nationalisms that have made conflicts more devastating to clashes between different areas of the world on a planet paralyzed by global disorder.

These interdependent processes, not governed by supranational authorities, also cause devastation in the most advanced democracies on the planet and, more generally, a crisis of democracies that have often given way to autocracies. The crises have produced both horizontal and vertical inequalities to which European policies have not provided adequate answers.

In this context, the opportunity of the "*Future Summit 2024*" convened in New York on September 22-23, 2024, must be seized by the European Union to reaffirm its commitment to peace, justice, combating climate change and inequality, and overcoming the crisis of multilateralism.

The illusion of European states - thinking they could cross global upheavals unscathed by retreating into a nationalist dimension reminiscent of the 19th century - has been swept away not only by African and Asian migration flows but also by the progression of continent-sized states and new variable geometry alliances.

In this spirit, greater attention is needed to China's actions - besides the aggressive expansionist ambitions of Russia and other growing autocracies - which for decades have been active in Africa but are also expanding in other areas of the planet: a situation that requires the identification of a role for the European Union, including in the direction of conflict reduction and resolution.

The populations of the Mediterranean, African, and Middle Eastern regions - and especially the youth, who represent the majority - had expressed, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the desire to break free from the totalitarian regimes of their countries, asserting human rights. However, the international community, the European Union, and national states failed to provide them with adequate support, and the Arab Springs quickly turned into the winter of democracies that were still in their infancy.

The ongoing migration processes are a glaring testimony to the inadequacy of policies (not only) European ones for the progress of areas fleeing from wars, tribal conflicts, hunger, land expropriation, and environmental disasters.

Relations with Mediterranean countries in Africa and those belonging to the Middle Eastern area have never been developed by the European Union based on genuinely supranational strategies and a Mediterranean policy aimed at pursuing Euro-Arab-African integration capable of overcoming the colonial conception that has long characterized these relationships.

In addition to the issues mentioned above, there are those of energy and climate change that continue to be addressed by national states, individually and in international forums, with limited chances of success in the absence of governing entities and policies capable of confronting and managing the interdependent processes that characterize them.

The inadequate outcomes of international summits dedicated to combating climate change are a consequence of this situation, even though the European Union had appeared as the world's most advanced area in environmental protection before movements driven by populist desires to halt progress toward sustainable development emerged in European debate.

To respond to US protectionism (which risks radicalizing after the presidential elections on November 5), aggressive Russian nationalism, the transformation in the global power network, and Chinese economic neo-colonialism, the reopening of the European construction site appears necessary to equip the European Union with the powers and tools essential to play an autonomous role as a global actor and to initiate a new cycle

in the governance of interdependence marked by balanced and sustainable development, by détente, and by respect for human dignity.

All these situations call upon the European Union as a whole and each member state. Each of them requires a response.

I. What is at stake in the tenth European elections?

The European Union is still capable of harnessing potentials over risks generated by so many crises and factors of instability and conflictuality. This is on the condition that a clear vision of the choices to be made is developed, the conditions for a shared political will to implement them within the scheduled timeframe are created, and it is endowed with both institutional and financial resources and the indispensable tools to achieve the desired results.

There is a need to prioritize the search for a common European identity while respecting diversity, particularly through the cultural dimension as an essential element of European citizenship based on common values and principles.

The European Union must be endowed with the necessary powers to ensure its ability to act effectively in policies at the European level where unity and convergence are essential, allowing Member States and local and regional authorities to intervene where it is more appropriate to ensure diversity.

Reversing the logic that has often paralyzed Italy's action in sterile theoretical oppositions, we must return to conceiving foreign policy as an essential part of a comprehensive national vision, that is, a strategic plan that we must carry out in Europe and internationally, overcoming national logics and entrenched positions within the limits of an apparent sovereignty that, according to some, would only be guaranteed in an organization based on a confused confederal model.

Anticipating a conclusion that we intend to draw from the study of priorities for the next legislature, we believe that the European Union could equip itself with the resources and tools necessary to implement the United Nations' Agenda 2030 by the end of the tenth legislature only if it gradually integrates the current intergovernmental treaty norms contained in the Treaties into a constituent process to provide the European Union with its own Constitution.

It must be conceived and elaborated with a dual democratic method: parliamentary and participatory.

The European Constitution must be consistent with the common values and principles written in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which should be its cornerstone.

The European Union, which has proven capable of responding to emergencies, will need to swiftly plan its own future, knowing that the ability to plan it is both a project and a process, both of which are indispensable in a complex society that allows all its components to interact, inform each other, and decide responsibly.

II. The Legacy of the Ninth European Legislature

The ninth European legislature began in 2019 with signs of hope for a continent united in freedom and peace, reconciled with nature, and ready to harness new technologies within a geopolitical framework.

In the eyes of its citizens, the European Union then appeared as a solid and deeply rooted construction to such an extent that, after the outcome of the British referendum on Brexit in 2016, hardly any political force proposed the dissolution of the European system or withdrawal from the European Union.

The entire ninth legislature was subsequently subjected to external and internal challenges already foreshadowed by Donald Trump's presidency in 2017 and the increase in migratory flows caused by countless and unstoppable conflicts, the acceleration of what has been called the infosphere, external interference, environmental devastation of the planet, the pandemic, violent obscurantism in Afghanistan and Iran, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the resurgence of inflation, and Hamas' terrorist attack on Israel.

Despite these disruptive challenges, the European Union has been able to provide those living within its territory with unimaginable benefits compared to the rest of the world in terms of gender equality, the promotion of a common way of life, the defence of the rule of law, territorial cohesion, social dimension, ecological and digital transitions, and the fight against the pandemic. However, they have been perceived and implemented unevenly, signalling a great capacity for reactive response in times of crisis but not an aptitude to consistently govern these processes.

The guarantee of these benefits has also highlighted the fact that if the European Union were to remain stagnant in implementing these benefits, we would all pay the price of a non-Europe and lose the potential that could instead be exploited with better use of resources, which means excluding the status quo and fragmentation but choosing the path of innovation and integration.

The end of the ninth legislature will leave us with an unfinished Europe: fundamental decisions for the interests of citizens and more generally of individuals and our economies will be missing, which could have contributed to strengthening public conviction that the European Union can respect the commitments made but partially unfulfilled.

The outstanding issues, essentially and in brief, are as follows:

- The political agreement on the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact and the commitments that Member States will have to face raise the issue of the resources needed to finance a policy aimed at supporting ecological and digital transition, social inclusion, but also the industrial challenge - including that of defence - initiated by the United States with the IRA and to address the Chinese challenge. As will be discussed later, the central point is the production of European public goods to be

financed with resources identified within a project that initiates the creation of a European fiscal capacity.

- The revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 should have been a model of macroeconomic and fiscal policy in view of the negotiations that will start in 2026 at the expiration of the Next Generation EU (NGEU), but this opportunity was not seized by the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission so it will be at the centre of negotiations for the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2032 in an enlarged Union;

- The completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which is still halfway there, poses the problem of completing the construction of the Banking Union and the Capital Market Union as one is a prerequisite for the other and both are essential for the credibility of the global euro as they are necessary to create risk-sharing mechanisms, to contribute to macroeconomic stability, to assist in recovery, and to ensure shared prosperity;

- The compromise between the European Parliament and the Council on the reform of all legislative acts related to the Dublin Regulation with the strengthening of expulsion rules, financing of repressive measures, outsourcing border control to third countries of dubious reliability, and biometric surveillance raises the issue of compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as that of international conventions and leaves open the construction site for the definition of reception and hospitality procedures, as well as the implementation of the objectives of the area of freedom, security, and justice, never fully completed twenty-five years after its conception;

- The still-open environmental issues and the most recent regressions compared to the commitments of the European Green Deal call for future legislative decisions to achieve the goal of a carbon-free society through energy efficiency, the use of low-carbon technologies, and the implementation of recycling and the circular economy.

- Digital transition is linked to the prospects opened up by interinstitutional agreements on all rules related to Artificial Intelligence (AI), essential to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the European Union along with investments in the infosphere, the protection of fundamental rights, and the use of its democratic potential such as Blockchain, the fight against external interference, and agreements with third countries;

- The directive for adequate minimum wages is just one of the instruments of European social policy on the path to what someone had called the Social Compact: it must be added to the protections of workers in the changed technological context of the labour market endangered by the lack of agreements on digital platforms and on the duty of diligence of companies for sustainability;

- Initiating a reflection on a new economic, social, and territorial cohesion policy must be placed in the perspective of an enlarged European Union and the response to growing inequalities.

- Common foreign policy in the security and defence dimension, far beyond the so-called strategic compass and permanent structured cooperation, should lay the groundwork for a true European pillar of an Atlantic Alliance that returns to its original political and defensive nature (and not offensive and military) also in relation to the role of the United States and conflicts at the borders of the European Union.

This array of problems reinforces the need for reforming the European system to overcome the current treaties with a constituent process to make the European Union capable of deciding its own destiny and moving away from a purely emergency-based approach.

The constituent process of a new Europe, whatever method is adopted, will occupy a significant portion of the next legislature: it is necessary to go beyond the current framework by endowing the European Union with a new constitutional charter.

Due to the unavoidably lengthy timeline of the agenda to reform the European Union, European parties will need to outline the things that must be accomplished for a significant part of the next legislature within the current treaties, utilizing all the tools permitted by the current rules.:

- the legislative and financial proposals of the Commission.
- the actions necessary to achieve the objectives set by the Treaties even if they have not provided for the powers as allowed by Article 352 TFEU.
- the passerelle clauses to overcome the unanimity constraint on a case-by-case basis (Articles 31 and 48 TEU and 81, 153, 192, 312 and 333 TFEU).
- reinforced cooperation (Art. 20 TEU and 82, 83, 86, 87 and 326-334) or permanent structured cooperation (Articles 42-46 TEU).
- the inclusion in the Treaties of additional protocols with reference to the social dimension and that on services of general interest.
- the request of the European Parliament to the Commission to present appropriate proposals to implement the objectives of the Treaties based on its power of legislative initiative (Article 225 TFEU).
- European Citizens' Initiatives (ECIs) addressed to the Commission (Articles 11 TEU and twenty-four, REG. EU 2019/788 TFEU) and petitions addressed to the European Parliament (Articles 20-24-227 TFEU and Article 44 of the Charter).

It is necessary and urgent to ensure to all people living in the European Union public goods, equal opportunities, and rights, well-being and security, respect for diversity and inclusion, developing a model of democracy consistent with the values of the European Union and demanding that such a model be respected by Member States, candidate countries, and in relations with third countries.

This can be done by applying the fundamental principles of the rule of law, unambiguously sanctioning those who violate them, safeguarding cultural diversity, ensuring the right to security, ensuring shared prosperity, allocating adequate financial resources to serve people, reducing inequalities, and laying the foundations for a European welfare system, welcoming those who have suffered the extreme offense of the disregard for their human dignity, and pursuing the objectives of sustainable development.

III. European public goods

There are four reasons that make it necessary to create European public goods, entrusting their management today to the European Commission and tomorrow to a genuine European Government under the control of the European budget authority (European Parliament and Council), and withdrawing management responsibilities from national governments with the aim of overturning the logic of the NGEU in which the resources and powers of its implementation were allocated by the European Council to the Member States albeit under the supervision of the European Commission.

The first reason is linked to the transnational dimension of the challenges that the Member States collectively must address, beyond the capacity of action of individual national governments considered separately. They concern public goods consistent with the achievement of the objectives on which membership and adherence to the European Union are based (Article 3 TEU), which we seek to summarize here in twelve "unions":

- Union for Health
- Union for Energy
- Union for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technologies
- Union for Environmental Sustainability
- Union for Shared Prosperity
- Union for the New Generations
- Union for Culture
- Union for Science and Research
- Union for Internal Security
- Union for External Security including Defence
- Union for Welcoming and Inclusion
- Union for Industrial Promotion and Innovation

The second reason is related to the need to strengthen the sense of belonging to the European Union among people living within its territory and to make them understand its essential added value compared to the dimension of national states.

The third reason is linked to the need to translate into concrete European policies the objective of a European fiscal capacity, autonomous from that of the member states: new and genuine own resources are the condition for the creation of European public goods, and the autonomous fiscal capacity of the European Union will be accepted by all only if it is based on the sharing of collective interests.

The fourth reason is connected to the need to accompany the reform of European economic governance and the rules for membership and participation in the Economic and Monetary Union - which inevitably translates into specific constraints for national budgets - with instruments of medium and long-term European "resilience", in order to enable the European Union to act in the interest of the people living within its territory.

The program of European economics and finance, in which to inscribe the objective of creating European public goods, is provided by the Multiannual Financial Framework: the set of challenges to which the European Union will have to respond has increased in quantity and quality, foreshadowing the need to initiate the realization of the twelve "unions" that we have indicated above.

The debate on the new Multiannual Financial Framework will unfold by the end of 2025 to cover the period 2028-2032, spanning two legislative terms, so that the future of the European Union's finances must enter the discussions among governments, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and national parliaments.

The capacity for European taxation will be linked to the reform of the institutional and decision-making system: it will involve the division of powers between the European Union and member states, the powers of intergovernmental institutions (European Council and Council), and supranational institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, and ECB), along with overcoming the method of responding to emergencies based on the extraordinary use of "solidarity measures" provided for in Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which proved to be a useful legal basis only for responding rapidly to the consequences of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

The list of European public goods indicates the extent to which only the European dimension can address the inadequacies of national dimensions.

For example, in energy policy, the European Union could and should have acted to "*ensure energy supply security, promote energy efficiency, energy savings, and the development of renewable and alternative energies*": this action has not been taken or has not been sufficient.

The same applies to other European public goods on which the European Union has not been able or willing to intervene: the rights to equality and solidarity, along with the goals of "full employment" and "social progress" laid down in Article 3 TEU, are not currently guaranteed to people living in its territory; internal and external security, sustainable development including biodiversity, our strategic autonomy in artificial intelligence, and the development of science and research recognized by the United Nations in 2020 as a "human right" and closely linked to the right to health have not been guaranteed.

In exemplifying public goods, we have indicated "Europe that welcomes and includes," namely, the governance of migration flows linked, on the one hand, to the right to asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights together with protection in case of removal, expulsion, and extradition (Article 19), and on the other hand, to the reception and inclusion of those fleeing hunger, environmental disasters, and land expropriation, qualified as "*economic migrants*."

These are shared or concurrent competencies on which the existing Treaties, through the definition of the principle of subsidiarity and decision-making procedures, have intervened by setting rules that are often confusing and sometimes contradictory: the aim was to leave European action under the control of the member states. On the relevant rules, the European Council has repeatedly intervened to decide not to decide, and the principle of consensus has often prevailed in the Council even when the Treaties provide for qualified majority voting.

In this regard, it is worth emphasizing the limits of the position, widely supported, that the abolition of the veto power alone would make the European decision-making system more effective, while it would be necessary to reduce the role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives and Management Committees to a purely technical and advisory role and to impose binding deadlines on the Council for decision-making, generalized co-decision procedures with the European Parliament, and maximum transparency in decision-making processes.

It is also worth recalling that, while the current Treaties and the report adopted by the European Parliament on November 22, 2023, provide that member states can no longer intervene where the European Union has adopted a specific legislative act, the project approved by the European Parliament on February 14, 1984, clarified instead that the intervention of the European Union within a concurrent competence would transform it into an exclusive competence, with the only constraint being that the decision was adopted through an "organic law."

Ensuring European public goods appears more challenging in areas that are currently subject to supporting competencies that are part of the "industrial and technological

innovation" unions, "culture," "new generations," and namely, education, vocational training, youth, and sports, as well as the entire scope of foreign policy, security, and defence: this inevitably requires the revision of the Treaties.

IV. European fiscal capacity¹

The introduction of European public goods raises the issue of the resources needed to ensure investments that will need to be progressively substantial and ensure the European Union's fiscal capacity independent of the member states.

The debate on new own resources to be allocated to the European budget, ongoing even before the pandemic, assumes even greater importance today. Firstly, following the introduction of the substantial recovery plan implemented by the European Union (NGEU), for which it became necessary to create new European public debt, with securities issued by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union to finance this plan (€ 806 billion at current prices). Part of these securities (€338 billion) finances non-repayable transfers to the Member States, and therefore the related cost of the debt will have to be borne not by the States, but by the European budget.

II The NGEU was created thanks to the decision to increase the ceiling of the European budget's own resources, thereby providing the guarantee to issue European public debt securities on the market that will have to be repaid starting from 2028 until 2058. Furthermore, beyond the NGEU, the various crises that have occurred in recent years require the European Union to have its own autonomous fiscal capacity (i.e., an adequate budget financed by European own resources) to be able to have both a stabilizing function in the event of asymmetric shocks, such as the sovereign debt crisis, and an allocative function for European public goods, such as combating climate change and managing a common European defence.

The gradual introduction of new own resources to be allocated to the Multiannual Financial Framework is provided for by the Own Resources Decision of 2020 and by the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Matters concluded by the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Subsequently, the European Commission provided further details on new revenue sources, accompanied by potential revenue estimates, in two successive proposals, in 2021 and 2023.

These concern own resources linked to environmental policy and corporate profits, with the aim of targeting economic inefficiencies, such as greenhouse gas emissions responsible for global warming, tax avoidance by large multinational companies, and tax competition within the single market. The European Commission has also proposed statistical resources, of a non-fiscal nature, the revenue of which is calculated through

¹This chapter is the result of collaboration between the European Movement and the Centre for Studies on Federalism, particularly the research contributions of Olimpia Fontana and Luca Gasbarro within a working group coordinated by the vice president of the European Movement, Giampiero Auletta Armenise, and involving Pier Virgilio Dastoli, Alberto Majocchi, Paolo Ponzano, and Anna Maria Villa.

an applied rate, for a specific sector, to available statistical data, and then paid in the form of national contributions from the public coffers of the Member States. These resources pass through national budgets, but their nature is closely oriented towards achieving relevant European policies.

In addition to the proposals already put forward by the European Commission, other sectors could be identified as a tax base for the introduction of additional new own resources. The criteria to follow should respond to efficiency assessments and their connection with European Union priorities.

Firstly, those sectors presenting strong negative externalities, i.e., economic, and social inefficiencies harmful to society, should be considered. This category includes the proposal to introduce European surtaxes in the gambling and tobacco sectors, both responsible for negative externalities, such as gambling addictions and serious health issues, and the financial transactions tax, for the risk of generating instability in financial markets. These are genuine European own resources, the origin of which excludes national budgets.

Secondly, the connection with certain European policies makes some proposals particularly useful for incentivizing virtuous behaviours, as indicated in the five examples below.

This is the case for the introduction of new statistical own resources, such as those based on the gender pay gap and food waste. However, they do not constitute genuine own resources, but rather national contributions from the public budgets of the Member States.

3.1 Self-generated resource based on gambling.

In Italy, the gambling sector is continuously expanding, despite repeated crises in recent years. In 2022 the volume of money played (the collection) increased by 54% compared to 2020 (a year in which it saw a 20% contraction due to the pandemic), rising from EUR 88 billion (2020) to EUR 136 billion (2022), thus setting a new historical record (Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli, 2022). However, the spread of gambling in Italy entails important social costs, such as the emergence of gambling addiction phenomena and the infiltration of the sector by criminal organisations.

In Italy in 2022, the revenue for the Treasury amounts to EUR 11.2 billion against a collection of EUR 136 billion, so the incidence of taxation on turnover corresponds to 8%. It is important to note that in 2018 this figure stood at 10%. In any case, it should be noted that the weight of taxation on gaming is also modest compared to other types of taxation, such as taxation on the labour income of individuals (between 23% and 43%). Gaming taxation, both in Italy and in the rest of the main European countries, is not uniform for the different types of games. Thus, while traditional games (lotto and lotteries) are subject to a tax levy corresponding to the residual fiscal margin, other sectors (betting and new-generation games) have different rates and tax bases depending on the type of game. Similarly, in other European countries, taxation systems are structured on a tax base that can be either the collection or the gross margin.

Differences are also found with respect to the tax rates applied, although they are on average higher in Italy.

A linear surtax, with a uniform rate, which is added to the national systems without changing their internal structure, could be the viable way to apply a European surtax on the gaming sector, in the form of a withholding tax on the amount of the winnings at the moment this amount is paid out. In the EU, the figure for total winnings (2022) is EUR 504 billion. Consequently, assuming a 10% tax rate on all winnings realised by players in the Member States, the revenue that could be realised would amount to EUR 50 billion per year.

Considering this proposal, it is important to point out an element of complexity, linked to the renewal of multi-year concessions to operators in the sector. According to the European principles on games (free competition on the common market, non-discrimination, protection of trust and good faith in relations between concessionaire and player and in relations between concessionaire and public administration, as set out in Article 49 of the TFEU and according to constant case law), concessionaires may avail themselves of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which is provided for any economic operator in respect of which a national authority has raised well-founded expectations. Therefore, in order to avoid, by application of the aforementioned principle, operators being entitled to challenge the way in which any changes are applied, the idea of introducing a European surtax on the amount of winnings requires some thought in connection with the reference tax framework of games and the renewal of concessions.

Given that taxation in the gaming sector affects the volume of collection, the income of operators receiving concessions and the player's winnings, once the renewal of concessions to operators has taken place, the taxation of collection and income of concessionaires should not change during the concession period, in line with European principles.

It would therefore be desirable for the legislator to provide that the amount of the prizes and winnings received, which can be equated to a source of income for the player, can also be subject to change during the term of the concession, so as to make the introduction of a European surtax on winnings possible.

Alternatively, it would be necessary to verify the compatibility of this proposal with the timing of the renewal of concessions in the various European countries with a timetable for the introduction of the European surtax on winnings, which would consequently take place in a gradual manner.

3.2 Own resource based on cigarette consumption.

The aim of European legislation in the tobacco sector is to harmonize national taxation, taking into account the achievement of a dual purpose: on the one hand, to provide stable revenue to the coffers of the Member States; on the other hand, to increase the level of health protection for individuals and thus reduce the negative externality of tobacco consumption. In fact, cigarette consumption within the European Union shows a continuous decreasing trend.

Within the European Union, each Member State has a different preference regarding the type of taxation (specific and ad valorem), but in establishing the level of taxation to be applied internally, common rules must be respected, such as a mixed taxation system, composed of both specific taxes (fixed based on quantity) and ad valorem taxes (percentage of price). This mechanism should ensure, on the one hand, that prices, although different among the various Member States, do not decrease beyond a certain threshold, so as not to incentivize tobacco consumption, and, on the other hand, that in the face of a decrease in consumption, fiscal revenue for the States remains stable through a gradual increase in taxes.

In line with the European Commission's intention to discourage harmful health consumption by applying an additional cost to cigarette consumption, it could be possible, under the same national tax regime and regardless of prevailing prices, to introduce a European surtax of 0.05 euros per cigarette. An optimal solution involves additional forms of taxation for electronic cigarettes, cigars, and pipe tobacco. However, limiting it to cigarette consumption, with a total amount of approximately 402 billion cigarettes in 2022, it can be estimated that a surtax of 0.05 euros per cigarette would generate revenue of twenty billion euros per year for the European budget.

3.3 Own resource based on financial transactions.

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the financial transaction tax (FTT) has often been evoked as a response to the sharp imbalance that has arisen in recent decades between the growth of the real economy and the growth of speculative finance. It differs from a tax on financial firms in that it does not aim to tax bank profits, but those transactions made at high frequency, often automated. It thus constitutes a burden on participants in financial markets that operate at very high speed, while financial transactions by small savers, such as loans, mortgages, insurance contracts and credit card transactions, remain excluded. Economists who are supporters of the FTT, such as Keynes, Tobin, Stiglitz, and Summers believe that such a tax would go a long way toward reducing high-frequency speculative transactions, those that are not only linked to the so-called "fundamentals" of the underlying assets and generate volatility, but also bring destabilizing effects to the markets. According to them, such a tax would function as a corrective measure, as by increasing transaction costs it would go to reduce speculative behaviour in the markets and thus reduce their volatility. On the other hand, detractors of the FTT argue that it would go to reduce liquidity in the market and thus distort market efficiency, causing increased volatility.

A further position in support of the FTT relates to the dutiful participation that the financial sector would be required to play in the production of public resources for the European budget, a thesis supported especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 fiscal crisis by the European Parliament.

In 2011, the European Commission proposed to establish a broad-based common European TTTF, with the aim of harmonizing taxation (which exists in various forms in European countries) and thus avoiding fragmentation within the single market for financial services. Estimates pointed to revenues of fifty-seven billion euros per year, to be allocated to the European budget. However, once it was established that unanimity

could not be achieved in the Council, the path of enhanced cooperation was taken in 2013 by a willing group of member countries, again without success. In 2018, France and Germany made a proposal to introduce an FTT based on the French model, characterized by a reduced tax base. In this new version, with an estimated revenue of 3.5 billion euros.

Effective implementation of the FTT should be based on multilateral consensus and coordination. Indeed, with widespread implementation, at least at the G20 level, it would be possible to reduce the evasion and relocation consequences typical of the FTT at the national level. A 2019 study (with 2017 data) estimates the revenue that could result from a global FTT, providing revenue estimates for EU countries. The tax base considered is broad, including corporate stocks and bonds (not government securities), exchange-traded derivatives, and over-the-counter derivatives, while the rate is low and differentiated: 0.1 percent on stock and bond transactions and 0.01 percent on derivatives transactions. Assuming even lower rates of, say, 0.05% for stocks and 0.025% for corporate bonds (while keeping 0.01% on derivatives), revenue of about twenty-three billion euros can be estimated, with a conservative assumption of high evasion.

3.4 Own resource based on gender-pay-gap (statistical resource)

As part of the Strategy for Gender Equality 2020-2025, the European Union has set out to promote equality between men and women in all areas, including that of pay (principle of equal pay, Article 157 TFEU). An own resource related to the gender pay gap (GPG) present in each member state would therefore be a legitimate candidate for funding from the European budget.

According to Eurostat data, in 2021 the GPG in the European Union is 12.7 percent, meaning that women earn almost 13 percent less than men. Women would have to work 1.5 months longer to make up the difference, because on average they earn €0.87 for every €1 earned by men. There is great variability in country performance across the European Union, with a low of 0.7 percent for Luxembourg and a high of 22.3 percent for Latvia (4.2 percent for Italy).

Introducing a statistical resource related to GPG requires defining some criteria. One proposal is to use 0% as a benchmark value to incentivize a complete reduction of the phenomenon. In addition, the rate and tax base must be established to determine how much each state should contribute. A tax rate of 0.003% of Gross National Income (GNI) could be applied for each percentage point above the benchmark (0%). Parliament estimates that such a resource designed in this way would allow GPG-based contributions totalling 4.8 billion euros to be taken from national budgets.

3.5 Own resource based on food waste (statistical resource).

The same method applied for reducing GPG could ideally also be used to incentivize the reduction of European food waste, another issue related to EU sustainability policies, such as the Farm to Fork strategy (part of the "European Green Deal"), which includes measures to reduce food waste and create a more sustainable food system. In fact, it

has been estimated that in the European Union 89 million tons of food, equivalent to 180 kg per capita, is wasted each year.

Complete reduction of food waste can also be assumed as a goal, to be incentivized through the payment of a national contribution based on countries' performance. Having Eurostat data available, a rate of 0.003 percent of GNI could be applied for each kilogram per capita of food waste produced by each country. It estimates that an own resource based on per-capita food waste would allow contributions totalling 5.2 billion euros per year to be taken from national budgets.

3.6 Conclusions.

The own resources proposed by the European Commission are planned to be implemented from 2028, obviously once the special procedure under the TFEU has been passed. All decisions on new own resources to supplement or replace existing measures to finance EU expenditure must comply with the own resources system under Article 311 (1) TFEU. Article 311 (3) sets out the procedure-a specific legislative procedure with some distinctive features-for implementing and amending the current own resources configuration. In practice, any decision on changes to the existing own resources system requires not only the unanimous consent of the Council, on the proposal of the European Commission, after consultation with the European Parliament, but also approval from each member state in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The basket of new revenues proposed by the European Commission once fully implemented is expected to generate a total revenue of between 45.2 and 47.3 billion euros. This is a useful amount to support the cost of debt issued to finance the NGEU, but does not meet the amount of investment needed, for example, to support European public goods such as the ecological transition and the nascent European industrial and defence policy.

Therefore, it is necessary to identify new additional own resources, such as those described here: if implemented simultaneously, they could generate total revenues of about 103 billion euros per year. Altogether, considering both the resources envisaged by the European Commission and those assumed here, the European budget could benefit from an amount of about 150 billion additional euros, corresponding to about 1 percent of the European Union's GDP.

Table 1 Proceeds from the introduction of new own resources (billion euros)

Own resources proposed by the European Commission	Billion euros	%
Genuine European Resources		
Reformed ETS	19	13%
CBAM	1,5- 2,1	1%
First Pillar	2,5 - 4	2%
Statistical resources (national contributions)		
Company profits	16	11%

Non-recycled plastic packaging waste	6,2	4%
Total own resources proposed by the European Commission	45,2 - 47,3	31%
Additional own resources		
Genuine European Resources		
Gambling	50	34%
Tobacco	20	13%
Financial transactions	23	15%
Statistical resources (national contributions)		
GPG	4,8	3%
Food waste	5,2	3%
Total additional own resources	103	69%
TOTAL OWN RESOURCES	148,2 - 150,3	100

There is therefore a need to rethink implementing a profoundly innovated budgetary framework. The prerequisite is the initiation of a public and transparent debate on the future of European finances involving all levels of representative democracy: we suggest that the Multiannual Financial Framework be submitted to "interparliamentary assizes," such as those held in Rome in November 1990 on the eve of the Intergovernmental Conferences on the Maastricht Treaty that came into force on November 1, 1993.

Along with interparliamentary dialogue, it will be important to submit the goals of the future of EU finances to transnational panels of European citizens in deliberative ways knowing that our assumptions about "unions" and European public goods recall and are consistent with the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

V. Unfinished Europe

European policies will need to be consistent with the goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, which represent an agenda for an orderly model of governance of the planet.

- the fight against poverty,
- the fight against hunger,
- health and well-being,
- quality education,
- gender equality,
- clean water and sanitation,
- clean and affordable energy,
- decent work and economic growth,
- enterprise, innovation, and infrastructure,

- inequality reduction,
- sustainable cities and communities,
- the fight against climate change,
- life under water,
- life on earth,
- peace, justice, and strong institutions partnerships for the goals.

Leave no one behind is a central principle of the United Nations 2030 Agenda because it represents an unequivocal commitment to end all forms of discrimination along with the principle of promoting fundamental rights and the principle of gender and generational balance.

The European Union was ahead of its time in its UN commitments with its Charter of Fundamental Rights in which the following principles and values are affirmed:

- Of human dignity,
- of freedom,
- of equality,
- solidarity,
- and justice

as public goods for all people living in its territory.

The policies of the European Union in the tenth European legislature will have to be consistent not only with the goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and the Charter of Fundamental Rights but will have to update and complete the commitments that the European institutions had made in the areas that were considered priorities at the beginning of the ninth legislature but that have remained halfway through or have even regressed due to compromises unfortunately shared by variable geometry majorities in the European Parliament driven by the desire to follow the populist impulses of a part of public opinion in the belief that they will gain electoral advantages.

This has particularly affected the ecological transition also in its relationship with respect for nature and agricultural policies, in migration policies, in the social dimension, in the European budget, in external relations and in respect for the values of the European Union.

We indicate below the areas where the process of European integration is still unfinished.

- a. Respect for the rule of law.

Among the values to be not only protected but promoted by member states and the European Union is respect for the rule of law.

Together with human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights it is the indispensable (though not sufficient) prerequisite in the realization of the objectives arising from participation in the European Union.

To protect respect for these values, the TEU (Art. 7) provides for a warning system in case there is a risk of a serious violation of these values by a member state. Added to this is the suspension of the voting rights of the state in question if the violation takes place and is serious and persistent.

The problem with this mechanism is that its activation is almost impossible because of the high majorities it provides for in the European Parliament and in the Council in addition to the unanimity provided for in the European Council, but also because the values referred to are formulated in such general terms that potential member states subject to these procedures can invoke the principle of respect for national constitutional identity, which is also protected by the European Union.

The importance of a supranational approach to respect for the rule of law has been confirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights in whose preamble it is clearly stated that

"The European Union is founded on the indivisible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity; it is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law. It places the person at the centre of its action by establishing the citizenship of the European Union and creating an area of freedom, security, and justice. The European Union contributes to the preservation and development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identity of the Member States and the ordering of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels."

Over the years, the EU Court of Justice has helped define the scope of the objective of transforming the European Union into an area of freedom, security and justice, making it clear that its realization is the precondition for the establishment of mutual trust and mutual recognition of decisions taken in this field by a member state by other member states.

Since domestic courts are entrusted with the application of European Union law, they must be guaranteed the principles of autonomy and independence from other national powers not only when applying European Union law but in all cases, these principles being a systemic condition of the proper functioning of a judicial system and fair justice, not bent to the strongest interests.

The Charter thus becomes the channel that enables the full right of every person to a fair trial before a judge who is independent and autonomous in his decisions, according to standards shared among member states.

Therefore, today the mechanism provided by the Treaty has as its reference objective procedures and determinations that are linked in good substance to the violation of Charter rights: therefore, the decision to entrust a central role to the Court of Justice in putting a state on notice - also thanks to a more widespread adoption of precautionary measures in cases of urgency - and in sanctioning it as envisaged in the 1984 Spinelli Project, overcoming the current immobility, seems mature. In the transition, to give more coherence and authority to policies to protect the rule of the

law, a Commission of Experts, modelled after the Venice Commission, should be established to direct supranational and member-state reaction to the most serious violations and to collaborate with the Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DFRMG) established by the European Parliament's LIBE Committee in 2019 and expanded in 2022. The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) should, in addition, also be given inspection tasks.

b. Eliminate inequalities and create a true European welfare.

During the current legislative term, the European Union has relaunched the European social model.

State aid operations for Covid marked the social dimension primarily with the SURE program: in fact, loans directly negotiated by the European Commission and the ECB were granted for one hundred billion euros aimed at preserving jobs through supplementary allowances, loans linked to training initiatives and paid with public funds.

In addition, the European Commission wanted to enhance the European Social Pillar by understanding it as a program to implement all twenty principles and rights recognized in the twenty-seven member countries, the Charter of Rights, and the European Social Charter.

This project was detailed in the March 2021 Action Plan, which provides for diverse ways of implementing the Social Pillar depending on whether the European Union has competence: directives, regulations, recommendations, Action Plans, solemn documents, guidelines, etc.

At the regulatory level, the European Union has intervened with directives on work-life balance, gender equality, transparency in pay, domestic violence against women, and transparency in working conditions.

The Adequate Wages Directive has "challenged" the boundaries of European competence, while still respecting those five countries that do not have legal minimum wage systems but are expected to achieve the directive's goal through contractual instruments.

Important references to the Social Pillar are also in the text of the political agreement achieved by the European Parliament and the Council on the Artificial Intelligence Act on December 8, 2023 (see on infosphere): it in fact contains important labour regulations (as the labour sector is considered in the future Regulation "at risk" and therefore deserving of ad hoc discipline against abuses in the use of AI).

Equally linked to the Social Pillar is the establishment of the Labor Agency, also tasked with the verification of the many administrative requirements on states arising from the new directives, beginning with the one on adequate wages.

To this hard law material must be added the many soft law measures such as the Council Recommendation on adequate minimum wages and the European

Commission's guidelines on legitimate collective bargaining by self-employment associations.

However, at the end of this legislative term, the European Commission's Social Pillar Implementation Plan has seen two major setbacks.

On the directive regulating work on digital platforms, a blocking minority led by Germany and France prevented its approval even though many of its provisions are articulations of the general principles and rules set out in the AI Act (the passage of which seems certain instead).

Even for the due diligence directive, which establishes obligations for the largest companies to monitor and verify respect for human rights even in production chains, most states were not reached although similar transparency and monitoring obligations for these companies are already provided for in the corporate sustainability reporting directive.

The contrary position of some states therefore seems incomprehensible and inconsistent with what is already provided for in European law.

In this framework, ensuring widespread prosperity is the precondition for reducing inequalities and laying the foundations for greater integration.

European welfare with a common pillar of social rights - seen that unites, according to the principle of subsidiarity, local, regional, macro-regional, national, and European responsibilities - must contribute to an integrated European labour market, the implementation of which has yet to be completed.

This includes the need for a renewed and strengthened social dialogue as a defining element of European economic democracy.

The European Social Pillar included in a new Progressive Social Protocol should include measures to ensure European public goods, such as the right to lifelong learning throughout and at the end of employment in compliance with the Bill of Rights: the latter guarantees older people active participation in social and cultural life, gender equality and work-life balance, safety in the workplace, worker participation, full portability of social rights and benefits across states to ensure the right to equitable worker mobility.

It should provide an adequate minimum income (through a directive) for those without necessary resources, combining monetary benefits, aid with forms of social pricing for essential benefits, the possibility of consensual access to training services and participation in social inclusion programs, excluding intrusive forms of coercion to work that do not respect the dignity of the people the measure is intended to safeguard, the guarantee of the right of non-regression and the legal principle of "more favourable conditions," access to public services for people with disabilities by eliminating multidimensional barriers, universality of services to all people with a model financed by a fair tax system.

European welfare should guarantee forms of unemployment insurance and social shock absorbers, fair working conditions and adequate and stable balance between workers' and employers' rights and obligations as well as between flexibility and security to facilitate job creation, recruitment, and adaptability of enterprises.

The fight against youth unemployment deserves special attention with the full implementation of the "European Youth Guarantee" through a serious rethinking of the tools for its implementation, an offer from the end of studies and/or unemployment, high quality standards, training courses, internships and apprenticeships, measures to increase confidence in institutions and to strengthen institutional capacity to service delivery along with European measures to reduce the generation gap and specific funds dedicated to it (housing issue and credit).

The European Union should enhance the role of participatory and cooperative forms of economy as well as social economy enterprises, favouring initiatives on social entrepreneurship, social innovation designed to produce both economic and social values, contributing to the formation of human capital without which the European Union will become a desert of rules and currency.

European welfare must be characterized by binding instruments-regulatory with new directives or the strengthening of existing ones, decision-making and financial-both for member states and European institutions with rights that apply to EU citizens and residents of third countries.

In short, while negative integration of a social nature (setting limits and minimum standards to be met in the employment relationship) has made great strides to date, "positive" integration relevant especially to welfare benefits is rather stalled for lack of adequate social investment by the European Union except in the limited dimension of the Cohesion Funds.

Where it will not be possible to proceed with agreements among all 27 member countries, it will be necessary to use enhanced cooperation or to act through innovative instruments such as the elaboration of a social compact following the example of the Schengen agreements that initially involved a very limited number of countries, or the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty.

c. Promoting the right to migrate

There are more than 110 million people forced to flee globally, and one person in every two hundred in the world is a refugee, three-quarters of whom have found asylum outside Europe while in the European Union they do not exceed 1 percent of the resident population. To give a term of comparison, Europe-which is only partly a land of immigration (legal, illegal, of asylum seekers)-has been a land of emigration for decades: from 1836 to 1914, thirty million Europeans sought and found refuge in the United States.

Current treaties define asylum and immigration strategies and competencies, grounding them in the values of respect for human dignity, equality, solidarity, rule of law, and respect for human rights.

However, in the face of dramatic waves of migration and asylum seekers, the European Union has demonstrated a remarkable inadequacy in dealing with them.

The growing arrivals of refugees from war-torn areas or people fleeing political persecution, hunger, environmental disasters and "land-grabbing" have created serious internal problems in various countries, torn the spirits of Europeans and brought out atavistic fears resulting in unacceptable forms of closure.

Effectively addressing these problems requires a true European policy that can manage the complex phenomenon of migration in a balanced way and graduating appropriate reception formulas along with protecting rights, promoting human development and inclusion.

A strategy is needed that:

- treats migration as an opportunity and not an issue of public order and security.
- places measures within the framework of the European Social Pillar, since getting migrants into work means giving them dignity and opportunities for integration into the European socio-economic context.
- provide adequate support for the economic development of the countries from which migrants depart and take action to reduce and eliminate conflicts and to ensure the safety of nongovernmental organization workers.
- identify the absorption and integration capacities of migrants on the European territory, take charge of concretely addressing the multifaceted challenges of proper insertion and much-needed inclusion, and recognize cities as the mechanisms and engines of integration because it is through host cities and their democratic culture that migrants become European citizens.
- contemplates instruments of peace-making in the Mediterranean also through the creation of European peace corps with a mediation function in conflicts.
- also knows how to explain to European populations the opportunities represented by the arrival of asylum seekers and economic migrants.

In this spirit, the European Movement believes that, together with the European Commissioner responsible for all policies that refer to migration issues and separately from aspects of internal security, member states should entrust migration policies to ministers responsible for welfare issues and not, as is now the case in all member states, to interior ministers.

In our view, a true European migration policy must contain measures to ensure freedom of movement for job search, equal access to the labour market, equal opportunities, fair working conditions, health and safety at work, health care, conditions and treatment of foreign workers returning home before the end of the minimum retirement period, and child care.

In fact, there are various models to refer to: from considering migrants as a resource for inland, depopulated and economically declining areas, where they can become an element of development; to identifying "circular migration" policies, thus facilitating the arrival of workers and, subsequently, their return home with the possibility of maintaining cultural and financial relations with host countries.

The European Movement supports the opening of legal avenues of access through humanitarian corridors for those fleeing wars, tribal conflicts, hunger and environmental disasters, the protection of unaccompanied minors and the facilitation of family reunification, the acceleration of procedures for granting humanitarian visas and temporary protection permits, support for the action of the European Asylum Agency and mandatory resettlement programs, a European *ius soli*.

We agree with the proposal to identify the beneficiaries of international protection in African and Middle Eastern countries where the movements of asylum seekers thicken, through a system of garrisons coordinated at the European level preferably placed at the EU delegations in third countries and ensured by the major humanitarian organizations, which take in those who take refuge in those territories, in order to remove them from the blackmail of criminal organizations and human traffickers. Subsequently, the transfer from the international garrison to the destination states, where they can formalize their asylum claims by setting fair reception quotas for each state, should be guaranteed.

In this spirit, we believe it is urgent that the European migration policy (including the visa issue) be based on an approach that views it as a response to a structural and not an emergency crisis, that excludes coercive mechanisms, that introduces the principles of the path, professional experience and aspirations of asylum seekers, and that provides for the application of the solidarity contribution not only in the case of self-suspension from the system but also in the case of non-implementation of relocation decisions.

We also believe that the European Union and member states within the United Nations- and particularly the European permanent and no permanent members in the Security Council- must raise the issue of updating the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention: it in fact responds to an outdated logic, which is limited to granting international protection "to any person...in justifiable fear of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, who is outside the State of which he is a national...." Today it is necessary to prepare legal instruments for mass migrations, not for individual situations as envisaged by the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration signed in Marrakesh in December 2018 but not yet ratified by some European countries including Italy.

The reception and migration policy must be accompanied by a renewed and strengthened cooperation and aid policy within the framework of a European investment plan based on public/private partnership by intensifying the involvement of European socioeconomic partners and considering the political situation and regimes in underdeveloped and developing countries.

There is a need for a Euro-Mediterranean policy that guarantees peace, security and solidarity in the region by relaunching the idea of a "ring of friends" and initiating concrete projects such as those of a strengthening of the role of the EIB and EBRD not excluding the possibility of new specialized financial instruments in the area, of mixed universities with parity between the North and the South in the framework of an effective mobility of students, researchers and professors, and of periodic "assemblies" of civil society and local communities that allow free confrontation and the development of active citizenship. Coupled with this issue is the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Erasmus.

In Africa and especially in its relations with the African Union, the European Union can take positive action-unlike China and Russia-to accompany (and condition) the instruments of financial cooperation with actions to build or strengthen democratic governance, evolution toward the rule of law and respect for human dignity that have appeared in recent years as a key lever for economic growth.

d. Strengthening European cohesion policy.

It should be recognized that cohesion policy is the main European investment tool designed to achieve the goal enshrined in the Treaties: it contributes added value by creating jobs, sustainable growth, and modern infrastructure, removing structural obstacles, enhancing human capital, and improving quality of life.

It facilitates cooperation between regions, cities, and municipalities, as well as cooperation between the private sector, knowledge centres and social partners at the regional level.

In this context, we draw attention to the following useful positions to achieve a stronger policy that promotes cohesion. It needs to:

- functions as a long-term investment policy for all European regions, with the aim of supporting local and regional growth and employment by promoting innovative solutions to challenges such as climate change and energy transition, for social inclusion and for cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation.
- is confirmed as more necessary than ever as an expression of European solidarity to overcome economic, social, and territorial disparities, since it offers all people, wherever they live in Europe, a real opportunity to experience the benefits of the European Union.
- should be better presented, in communication actions, as the European policy implemented at the level closest to citizens and with a direct impact on their daily lives.
- continues to be an effective policy with adequate resources provided through grants and, where appropriate, through financial instruments (loans).
- is based on the existing European Structural and Investment Funds, with a more effective set of common provisions.
- promotes the strengthening of the partnership principle and the place-based approach, consolidating the key role of local and regional authorities through active

involvement of urban and rural communities and the promotion of instruments to incentivize and support local development through integrated strategies.

- should be better coordinated and put on an equal footing with other European policies, considering the specific characteristics of municipalities, cities, and regions in the European Union.

- should be simplified and improved, based on greater mutual trust between the different levels of government responsible for implementing funds and a more flexible and differentiated approach.

e. Completing the European Green Pact for Carbon Neutrality.

The Ursula Coalition was formed in November 2019 because of the consensus obtained by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the three policy priorities of the 2019-2024 legislature:

- climate neutrality,
- the digital society
- and the geopolitical dimension.

The priority of priorities had been identified by the European Commission in the European Green Pact, which was adopted as the main innovation in European policies based on data provided by international science, the goals of sustainable development, the state of degradation of the planet, the need to provide Europeans with the public good of environmental quality, and the commitment to place the European Union at the forefront of the international fight against climate change.

The European Green Pact is consistent with international initiatives beginning with the Paris Accords of December 12, 2015, but even more so with the need to initiate a European strategy to guarantee biodiversity, namely the preservation of all living species that contribute oxygen, food and water by providing raw materials, energy, medical products and of course food.

The goal of ensuring biodiversity was translated at the end of 2022 into the COP15 Montreal Agreement signed by members of the United Nations and of course the European Union.

The European law on the "restoration of nature" on which the European Parliament voted by a majority is the essential legal instrument to maintain and implement one of the key objectives of the European Green Pact within the framework of a set of legislative acts proposed by the European Commission during the legislature and approved by the legislature (Council and European Parliament).

Despite all that has happened since 2020 (the pandemic, increased migration flows, the war in Ukraine, inflation, the new multipolarity), the European Green Pact appeared even more urgent and indispensable to most of the public opinion, scientists, and civil society.

The renunciation of tightening emission standards would condemn us to suffer them until the middle of the twenty-first century and would be contrary to the World Health Organization's standards that air pollution causes seventy thousand deaths in the European Union every year.

In recent years, the fight against climate change has been consistent with the initial guidelines of the European Green Pact, if one thinks in the agricultural sector of plant protection products and in the industrial sector of plastics.

Of the legislative package presented at the beginning of the European legislature by the European Commission, regulations have been approved in all its essential components by the two branches of the legislative authority in texts that have not deviated much from those proposed by the European Commission.

However, the path to carbon neutrality and the goal of "zero emissions" has not been completed and this requires an acceleration of European policies from the initial 2050 target with an exit from coal-derived energy by 2030, from fossil fuels by 2035 and from oil by 2040 through the adoption and implementation of a new European Green and Social Pact and substantial investments in renewable and alternative energies.

f. Implementing a common European industrial policy

The profound transformations in the world economy (global dispersion of production, automation and robotization, competition with emerging economies, overcoming the distinction between manufacturing and services) call for a change of course with respect to the topic of European industrial policy. It is no longer a question of assessing the "additionality" of European policies to those put in place by member states; rather, it is time to shape a common policy that starts from the European dimension and cascades the spaces of intervention for lower levels of government.

What is needed is an innovative European industrial policy that encourages and fosters energy efficiency, the circular economy, digitalization, and the development of automation and artificial intelligence compatible with the goal of full employment.

Our proposal is to rethink the idea of the "facilitating state" and innovator at the supranational level. It is at the European level that market failures produce the greatest costs, and it is at that level that the need for a public/private partnership capable of "creating markets" becomes strongest. It is not a matter of creating adequate capabilities, as is unavoidable in developing contexts, but of solving the coordination problem that arises in the attempt to organize the productive and innovative specialization of an entire Continent.

First and foremost, the European Union must work together with European companies, taking into account its productive fabric composed essentially of small and medium-sized enterprises (99.8 percent) to support them in their digital transformation and to

set up the correct framework as well as the conditions to promote innovation, investment, and financial and fiscal instruments that enable them to grow and expand.

The European Union must provide policies for the development of technological innovation, with a European control room capable of indicating strategies to be followed and coordinating the work of the participants while taking care that the industrial spillovers are as widespread as possible throughout Europe with a view to increasing the percentage share of industrial output in GDP.

In this framework, the process of automation that will involve the manufacturing industry and that will also require support measures at the European level will have to be accompanied by radical changes in the training of workers by rethinking educational programs and methodologies and using robotics as a stimulus for cognitive skills and the creation of high-quality jobs.

European industrial policy must be based on a comprehensive strategy that includes financial, legislative and nonlegislative measures in the areas of digitization, sustainability, circular economy, energy efficiency and social economy enterprises but also military technologies.

It must be able to rely on other supranational instruments: i) a federal system of public investment banks revolving around the EIB and involving the State Investment Banks of member (and international) countries. Such a system would have the capacity to make coordinated investments ; ii) European (innovative) public procurement, capable of mobilizing the critical mass of demand needed to ensure sustainable and accelerated development of infant industries and technological niches; iii) European public enterprises, mission oriented and capable of exploiting continental economies of scale in limited sectors where public-private partnerships appear most effective (e.g. Galileo, Ariane, Airbus by investing in new infrastructure, energy and technology projects) iv) a European asset, managed by a sovereign wealth fund, that would allow the benefits generated by European assets resulting from supranational investments to be intergenerational.

Such a European industrial policy should be accompanied both at the European and national levels, and especially in Italy, by effective and administrative simplification.

a. Protecting Rights in the Infosphere Society

With an acceleration that confirms the European Union's ability to respond to emergencies, the Council and the European Parliament have reached an agreement on the European Commission's proposal for a European Microchips Act: this is a plan to address the European industry's dependency on the production of electronic components, which impacts a sector worth 450 billion euros globally, where China and Taiwan hold hegemonic positions.

The European Union intervened with the European Data Act, establishing regulations on the access and use of data, particularly industrial data.

In this regard, it is necessary to consider the relationship between artificial intelligence and rights protection to ensure the quality, transparency, and interoperability of data. Blockchain technology appears essential to foster greater certainty in the collection of data processed by artificial intelligence systems, thus enhancing trust in the results produced by algorithms.

To respond to the emergency, European institutions have agreed to invest forty-nine billion euros with the European Microchips Act, of which 3.3 billion euros come from the European budget and 6.2 billion euros from national public funds. The objective is to increase the European share in the global market from 9% to 20% by 2030, knowing that the United States has decided to invest 52.7 billion dollars with their Chips and Science Act, which includes a substantial portion of tax breaks for research.

The three pillars of the European Microchips Act are the Chips for Europe Initiative (which involves the construction of laboratories and factories to increase microchip production), guaranteeing necessary supplies using public and private investments, and collaboration among Member States.

In addition to investment in microchip production, there is also the dimension of advanced research to accelerate European knowledge, which is currently stuck at the experimentation level, prioritizing the industrialization of European technologies.

European resources will benefit European microchip plants as well as their suppliers within the framework of developing cooperation between the European Union and the Member States, which will include constant monitoring of the semiconductor supply status, demand levels, and planning for any new crises.

The European Commission's initiative is accompanied by greater flexibility in the application of state aid rules, which concerns not only France and Germany but also Italy, which, for example, is a partner with France in STMicroelectronics, a leader in the construction of new microchip plants.

It is worth emphasizing three aspects of the agreement reached after the trilogue between the Council and the European Parliament with the active role of the European Commission:

- The European act is based on the public/private partnership, which is an essential method to ensure the competitiveness of the European infosphere.
- A portion of European industrial policy is initiated in a sensitive sector for our strategic autonomy.
- In a crisis, the "European dimension" of our relations with Taiwan is strengthened.

Beyond the European Microchips Act, everything revolving around the world adapting to artificial intelligence leads us from the Internet of Things (IoT) to the Internet of Everything and transcends territorial boundaries, raising constitutional questions of ethics and law in which the European Union is currently at the forefront.

The Declaration of December 15, 2022, on Principles and Rights for the Digital Decade has outlined common intentions and commitments and must guide policymakers in the digital transformation that prioritizes people and supports solidarity and inclusion through connectivity, education, training, and digital skills, fair and just working conditions, and freedom of choice in interactions with algorithms and artificial intelligence systems, as well as participation in the digital public sphere.

The European approach tends to distinguish itself from the American one characterized by the decisive role of big players in the digital market (BIG TECH) and from the Chinese approach, characterized by the extraordinary profiling capacity of an autocratic system (BIG STATE), by contrasting them with a culture of BIG DEMOCRACY. This culture is based on the regulatory capacity inherent in the European Union, characterized by the progressive transformation of shared ethical principles into regulatory instruments suitable for ensuring a significant balance between respect for fundamental rights and the needs of scientific and technological research.

An extensive process of disciplining the digital world, its technologies, and AI has been set up with the so-called Digital Compass, which has led to various measures such as the Digital Market Act, the Digital Service Act, and the Data Act, as well as a political agreement for an AI Act that also concerns the newest technologies of chatbots to reconcile the use of machines with respect for the fundamental rights of the Charter and human dominance. Specific rights to transparency and human control would be guaranteed to all those who conduct their work through platform intermediation.

b. Completing the Economic and Monetary Union

Completing the Economic and Monetary Union is a prerequisite and necessary condition for stabilizing the cycle but also for promoting sustainable growth and ensuring prosperity.

At the supranational level, a genuine economic government is needed to coordinate all instruments (monetary and fiscal) of economic and financial policy.

The overall governance system of the Monetary Union, designed primarily to manage shocks on a quantitative level, has shown all its limits in the face of large-scale crises.

The asymmetric way in which Eurozone countries reacted to the economic crisis, the application of rules designed to facilitate adjustments of individual economies to external shocks without any consideration of social consequences, the constraints on public finance affecting both current and capital expenditures indiscriminately, the methods and content of the reform implemented by the European Union in its economic governance after financial crises, mainly emphasizing the function of financial stabilization, the lack of adequate social compensations to drastically reduce the impact of these crises on the real economy and especially on the most vulnerable segments of

society, are all examples of how much progress still needs to be made for true political, economic, and social integration capable of delivering the promised benefits of the Monetary Union.

These problems, together with the anachronistic (but probably instrumental in reducing social spending) separation between monetary policy (under exclusive competence of the European Union), intergovernmental economic policy, and social policies largely under the competence of the Member States, have led to the failure to achieve the objectives of a "socially just" European single space.

The European tax system - with an overall tax burden on citizens and businesses that must remain globally unchanged but more evenly distributed according to the principle of progressivity - must have a high social value parallel to the harmonization of tax policies and national taxes, and shares of taxes under European competence, with coordinated management of overall tax pressure in an anti-cyclical sense.

The European Union must pursue the goal of greater harmonization among national tax systems to reduce tax competition, which has the effect of concentrating the tax burden on the least mobile factors of production, primarily labour.

In this context, the European Union must undertake strong initiatives against money laundering, tax evasion, avoidance, especially concerning multinational corporations, and "tax tourism," surpassing downward tax competition through real European tax harmonization.

c. Opening pathways for peace

"Eve of Destruction" was, in the mid-1960s, Barry McGuire's iconic song against the futility of war, any war, denouncing the explosion of the world in the hands of nuclear powers and the absurdity of systems that sent eighteen-year-old boys to fight "old enough to kill but not old enough to vote".

More than sixty years later, the world is once again at risk of exploding in the hands of the same nuclear powers, states with undeclared or under construction nuclear weapons, states that adhere to nuclear weapon-sharing, despite the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is estimated that there are over fifteen thousand nuclear weapons in the world today, the explosion of which would cause humanity's destruction if organized to target all areas of the planet.

Despite these massive arsenals, the prevailing opinion in the capitals of governing - or aspiring to govern - states is that nuclear weapons will not be used to win a ground conflict; that the USA, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom do not relinquish nuclear weapons because it is one of the tools to maintain the right of veto in the United Nations Security Council attributed to them as victorious powers; that the possession or sharing of nuclear weapons serves as deterrence to preserve the role of

geopolitical actors in areas of permanent tension around the world (India and Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, Turkey).

The large number of conflicts that have bloodied the world from 1945 to the present day - which in most cases have appeared as civil wars or have remained confined within a well-defined regional area - can expand and directly involve powers with extra-regional or global ambitions, as happened in Russia's aggression against Ukraine and as could happen in the Middle East.

In the face of this situation, the question arises with urgent dramatic intensity of the global role that the European Union can play within its strategic autonomy to build and maintain peace, already provided for in constant Treaties, by making available the military and civilian instruments at its disposal or that could be deployed rapidly while simultaneously strengthening the European peace instrument (European Peace Facility).

All of these issues should be part of the strategic priorities that the European Union should put on the table of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki-II), repeatedly called for by the European Movement together with the revival of cooperation between it and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and partnership with the African Union (AU) and be part of the agenda of the future European Geopolitical Community in the perspective of a process of differentiated European integration, whose contours will emerge during the constituent phase to be initiated with the next European legislature.

In the spirit and consistency with the commitment to peace, the European Union should sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on January 22, 2021, with 68 ratifications, the application of which was urged in September 2020 by 56 former presidents, prime ministers, and ministers of NATO member states who reiterated that "nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose given the catastrophic human and environmental consequences of any use."

In a deeply unstable planet with an international disorder in transition, it is evident that European strategic autonomy must follow the path of global multilateralism that focuses on the challenges of today's world without pursuing the tragic goal of replacing a sum of state nationalisms with continental isolationism of European nationalism (Europeans first).

All this raises the issue of reforming international global organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, where the European Union must prioritize respect for the rule of law, an indispensable value within its borders and in relations with third countries.

"Envisioning an international forum that renews the roots of peace, restoring dignity to a framework of security and cooperation (on the continent, Ed.) following the example of

the Helsinki Conference of 1975" - as stated by the Head of State Sergio Mattarella - is the primary responsibility of the European Union and its "strategic autonomy" upstream of its "strategic (military) compass" and within the framework of a single foreign and security policy, of which a common defence must be part downstream.

I. Ensure external security.

Defence is one of the symbolic grounds - along with democracy, rights, and currency - on which to build a new Europe. We are convinced that significant political benefits will be obtained and citizen consent towards the European Union will be strengthened if the economies of scale resulting from the integration of national defence systems are fully exploited.

In the new international system, European defence must be conceived as a tool to enable the European Union to effectively act for the maintenance (peacekeeping) and construction (peacebuilding) of peace, but also to intervene within the framework and under the mandate of the United Nations by creating European peace corps to contribute to mediation actions in local conflicts.

The European Union must act both to implement strict control over arms sales and for the mutual, balanced, and internationally controllable reduction of military forces and armaments.

In the short term, using the instrument of enhanced cooperation, common measures must be considered to react to cyberattacks and, through permanent structured cooperation, crisis management should be entrusted to a group of Member States. Progress should be made towards standardizing armaments, coordinating national industrial policies with common rules on arms sales outside the European Union.

Tools need to be provided to make the definition of common strategic interests more effective, such as expanding the missions of the European Staff, established in 2002, to manage long-term military operations, entrusting the MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability established by the Council on June 8, 2017) - in addition to non-executive operations - with executive missions in the perspective of a true European Headquarters on the model of SHAPE until 2003 and then became ACO (Allied Command Operations) and a Military Academy for the training of officers.

The low efficiency of defence spending in European countries as a whole also depends on the fragmentation of the internal defence market, which has so far been resistant to any integration effort: therefore, impetus must be given to a progressive convergence of national industries in the sector, safeguarding technological capabilities and employment base, in a perspective of realistic rationalization.

It is appropriate to propose to the UN the creation of an "International Police Force" (of which the integrated forces of European defence could be a nucleus) alternative to peacekeeping and peacebuilding tools that refer to military rather than police actions.

However, security and defence policy, the pulsating heart of a people's sovereignty, is based on an overall foreign policy strategy.

Strategic decisions on foreign policy, security, and defence in Europe are still firmly in the hands of national governments within the European Council or in the management of international relations despite the numerous missions of the European Union in third countries, while national parliaments and the European Parliament are effectively excluded from democratic control over choices that are part of the essential interests of citizens, such as peace and security. In this sense, the idea of entrusting defence coordination to a future "commissioner" would leave its confederal dimension unchanged, as has happened with foreign policy.

Therefore, security and defence policy can only be the result of choices legitimately and democratically made with full accountability to citizens, and thus requires political integration and decision-making mechanisms that are currently far from even being evoked.

Without these indispensable elements, permanent structured cooperation - subject to the unanimity constraint among a very large number of participating countries with strongly divergent positions on European defence - will suffer the consequences of the ineffectiveness of any intergovernmental cooperation agreement and cannot represent the embryo of a true transfer and sharing of sovereignty.

Before creating a common debt, it seems necessary for us to define genuine sharing of foreign policy objectives and equally shared perception of threats, willingness to pool defence instruments including nuclear ones in support of common missions and strategies, greater interoperability of national armed forces, a common public industry base, and common rules on arms sales to third countries.

A halfway concession would give rise to an ambiguous and ineffective model, with the risk that the already weak military and internal security capabilities of the 27 at the national level become an equally inefficient legal monster incapable of acting at the supranational level: all this would happen if European defence is not subject to the control of a federal government that is accountable to the parliament democratically elected by European citizens.

European countries need decisions and dimensions that allow them to address and overcome existing military deficiencies and decision-making and operational deficits.

The European government will need to represent the European Union in the United Nations Security Council in the future as a logical consequence of the allocation of a single European seat within the framework of a regional reform of the United Nations.

But beyond the unavoidable institutional reforms and the widespread use of qualified majority voting, the political problem of the relationship between the European Union and NATO must be resolved.

With the achievement of greater autonomy in CFSP, albeit complementary to NATO, the weight of the European Union within the Alliance would increase and would avoid excessive dependence on decisions made by the major ally. To pursue this objective, however, it is necessary to establish an Armaments Agency capable of providing to produce European armaments, supplementing the needs of intelligence and logistics currently largely provided by the United States.

The issue then arises of how to finance a common defence. It is evident that EU Member States could not be subject to double contributions, to both NATO and the European Union. Therefore, as European defence autonomy grows, gradual financial disengagement, but not political and strategic disengagement, from NATO should be considered, with some activities being assumed independently by the European Union, albeit in a complementary manner to those of NATO.

Collaboration between the European Union (and its Member States) and NATO is needed to coordinate investment processes in the defence sector to address such gaps and deficiencies, facilitate dialogue, and reach decisions that satisfy the main stakeholders (defence ministries, NATO, EU institutions, and the defence industry) and support European efforts to ensure efficient military capabilities.

Paralyzing political disagreements between Europeans within the European Union and those outside, sub-regions, as well as some key Member States such as Germany and Poland, need to be overcome.

m. ensuring internal security.

The fears of European citizens are also directed towards internal security in the face of international terrorism, which draws on matrices of Islamic fundamentalism and is provoked by individuals residing within the territory of the European Union, as well as organized crime.

The European Union has shown significant shortcomings and disconcerting limitations in its actions. Much has depended on the inadequacy of the Treaties, but more can be done even on their basis and by better structuring cooperative tools in the judicial field, among law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services.

In particular, reality has highlighted that the European Public Prosecutor's Office – established through the method of reinforced cooperation based on a compromise far from the community logic - cannot only have competence in guaranteeing the protection of the financial interests of the European Union, but must also operate for the effective enforcement of criminal law and defend our fundamental freedoms and our security.

This additional competence must involve initiative, coordination, and procedural efficiency; it must respond to an urgent need in the fight against terrorism, corruption, and organized crime by laying the foundations for a true "federal

prosecutor's office" and not just intergovernmental coordination of national prosecutors.

In the fight against terrorism, an important and urgent tool is the creation of a Federal Intelligence Agency, and in the fight against organized crime, the inclusion of the offense of mafia-style association in the criminal systems of other European countries as proposed by the European Parliament.

In this context, the European Union - also considering the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice - will have to establish rules that ensure both the security of rights (of individuals) and the right to security (of communities).

In this way, integration would develop into a system of concentric circles comprising various policies. On the other hand, members of the eurozone and the Schengen Area already participate in forms of deeper integration, with permanent or temporary exceptions for non-participating countries.

n. Creating a common European identity.

The theme of European identity within the framework of a multilevel identity is certainly an essential component of the broader dimension of European citizenship. Enhancing and safeguarding the common European heritage and educating and training towards a new European cultural identity must take on a priority role in defining the policies and programs of tomorrow's Europe, as well as the development of a cultural economy at the European Union level.

Many initiatives could be strengthened and complemented to support this fundamental pillar of European citizenship, built with the cement of European cultural and educational policies, by reinforcing the dimension of European civic education, the study of history, and knowledge of languages as a tool to enhance European multilingualism within national school curricula.

In this framework that combines the cultural and educational dimensions, it is important to equip the European Union with tools for dialogue between believers and non-believers and for combating radicalization, as had occurred during the ten years of the Delors Commission with the "*A Soul for Europe*" program, grounding these tools on Articles 10, 17, and 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro 2005) and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Paris 2005) constitute innovative legal frameworks defining European cultural production as a dynamic element centred around the individual and aimed at ensuring unity in diversity.

Cultural rights, active citizenship, and democratic participation in cultural processes are expressed in the work of heritage communities that enhance and safeguard local heritage with the goal of improving quality of life and transmitting our cultural traditions to future generations. They represent a useful legal reference for safeguarding traditions while innovating and creating new European cultural products.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the role of European culture (soft power) in spreading European values founded on cultural diversity as a source of dialogue rather than conflict, starting from art as a tool for peace, freedom of expression, openness to diversity, and cultural innovation.

Consequently, the creation of a network of European Cultural Institutes in non-European countries is proposed with the aim of disseminating and managing bilateral or multilateral cultural cooperation activities and promoting awareness of European values through the works of artists and writers from across Europe.

o. Introducing a new method for enlargement.

The Soviet Empire dissolved more than thirty years ago, and the countries of Central Europe that were part of it joined the European Union between 2005 (the Baltic countries with the countries of the so-called "Visegrad Group" in a state of progressive dissolution, together with Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) and 2007 (with the entry of Bulgaria and Romania); Croatia finally joined them in 2013.

It took fifteen years to complete the process of unification between Western and Central Europe: a territorial arrangement very similar to that before the world wars of the last century and before the division of Europe between American hegemony and Soviet imperialism was reconstituted.

As we know, the countries of Central Europe that emerged from the Soviet Empire sought protection under the umbrella of NATO, within the framework of American hegemony, before entering the common European house, also because the European Union had renounced being both the political partner of the Atlantic Alliance and the European pillar of its military organization, knowing or thinking until February 24, 2022, that the possibility of armed aggression by Russia against one of its former satellites would be very remote.

The Yugoslav Federation dissolved more than thirty years ago, but its territories gradually became independent states that waited a long time before applying for EU membership, starting with Macedonia (later renamed "North Macedonia") in 2004 and ending with Bosnia in 2016, passing through Montenegro in 2008 and Serbia in 2009 (together with Albania).

They waited even longer because they were granted "candidate status" (which is not formally provided for in the Treaty, with a formula suggested only in 2022 by Ukraine and then accepted by the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament), and even more so because negotiations for accession were opened, with Macedonia (North Macedonia) waiting for eighteen years.

The accession negotiations never embarked on a detailed examination of each dossier (which are more than thirty), as had happened for the countries of Central Europe, and the European Commission's annual reports on the state of internal reforms were considered in Brussels and capitals as a necessary but almost futile bureaucratic exercise.

Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, along with threats to Moldova and Georgia, has radically changed the geopolitical dimension of the European Union's relations with candidate countries because the Twenty-Seven have realized, perhaps belatedly, that the process of unification of the European Union towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans should proceed simultaneously or according to the "regatta" method, with negotiations starting or restarting all together and concluding based on the merits of each country or according to the "big bang" method irresponsibly imagined by Charles Michel for 2030.

At the European Council meeting on December 14 and 15, 2023, it was decided to start accession negotiations for Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia together with those for North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania, postponing relations with Kosovo and Georgia for better times, following either Charles Michel's big bang method to set a deadline or more likely the regatta method.

From a certain point of view, the choice between these two methods appears to us as marginal compared to two substantive aspects that have conditioned the debate on the territorial dimensions of the European Union and its external political borders for years.

The first aspect concerns the vexata quaestio of the alternative between deepening and enlargement, which has never been resolved during four previous unifications, or rather, has been resolved by privileging enlargement, as happened in 1973 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, in 1981 with Greece's accession, in 1986 with Portugal and Spain's accession because the Single Act was negotiated regardless of those accessions, in 1995 with Austria, Finland, and Sweden's accession preceding the Amsterdam Treaty, and finally with the big bang of 2005 preceding the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, considering the content of the irrelevant Nice Treaty of 2003 and remembering that representatives of candidate countries participated in the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty and were not invited to attend the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Theoretically, deepening before enlargement should have occurred with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which, however, was conceived in 1988 to achieve economic and monetary union and was then completed with the idea of laying the foundations for political union after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but which maintained, with its three pillars, a predominantly intergovernmental structure.

Faced with the prospect of a European Union that could expand its borders to the East towards Ukraine and Moldova and to the Southeast towards the Balkans, including thirty-four member states waiting for Georgia and Kosovo, political, economic, social, financial, and institutional logic would suggest that the geopolitical consequences of this enlargement be addressed and adopted before the completion of its unification, not only regarding its institutional functioning but also concerning the dimension and

structure of its budget, the principles of the rule of law, and respect for fundamental values starting from the protection of minorities, the primacy of European law, and the sharing of sovereignty, European citizenship, and free movement including migration policies.

The second aspect concerns the democratic dimension and ultimately the guarantee of informed consent because, according to the treaties, the European Parliament is consulted when a membership application is submitted and is only called upon to give its consent at the end of negotiations on treaties between the European Union and the candidate state, and national parliaments are initially informed about membership applications and are only called upon to ratify treaties concluded by governments.

It therefore appears necessary and urgent to update the accession procedures to strengthen the role of Parliaments (European and national, including regional bodies with legislative powers) throughout the enlargement process, as suggested by the European Parliament in the report of the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Affairs Committees, and by the report of the French National Assembly prepared by the president of the foreign affairs committee, Jean-Louis Bourlanges.

Finally, since in many cases, both in the Member States of the European Union and in the candidate countries, accession treaties are subject to confirmatory or consultative referendums, it is necessary to initiate information and communication campaigns, entrusting them to the responsibility and resources, including financial resources, of the European Commission and the European Parliament. This is to mobilize the action of civil society networks, social partners, academia, and education within European programs that are already open to the participation of candidate countries, ensuring that the unification of Europe is a successful operation.

VI. Why and How to Change the European Union

As demonstrated by the proposals put forward so far, much could be achieved without resorting to changes in the existing Treaties.

However, we believe that a true and profound reform of the European system is unavoidable to transition from the community method to the federal method, defining the essential elements of a united, democratic, and solidarity-driven Europe, along with the methods and agenda to realize it.

The European system, its mechanisms, and its rituals now display several inconsistencies. Many stems from its original framework, never truly overcome by the numerous subsequent Treaty modifications, which lead Europeans to doubt the full democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Others have become apparent in recent years due to the devastating sequence of crises: financial, economic, health-related, social, political, and military.

The usual method - which prioritizes agreements among governments - no longer

appears suitable for current times, and even less so for future ones. Likewise, the Convention method, bound by the obligation to submit the result of its deliberations to an intergovernmental conference and ratification in all Member States, does not meet the objectives of a transparent and participatory reform.

Instead, we are convinced that it is essential to proceed transparently and democratically by innovating the method to allow countries and peoples who have democratically agreed to share significant parts of their sovereignty to complete the journey towards a federal model.

Consistent with our federalist inspiration, which refers to the "Ventotene Manifesto" and has been consolidated over the years based on experiences gained during the European integration process, we intend to open a debate on the method that must lead, in a certain timeframe, towards a federal Union.

It is impossible to achieve this by amending parts of the current Treaties because it would be difficult for public opinion to understand, and it would require unanimous agreement from the governments of all Member States of the European Union, as well as parliamentary or referendum ratifications in each country.

A constitutive phase is needed, inspired by the method adopted by the European Parliament in its first legislature at the suggestion of Altiero Spinelli, followed by a deliberative phase where the intervention of popular sovereignty through a pan-European confirmatory referendum will be unavoidable. Moreover, the referendum instrument is already mandatory in many member countries and politically indispensable in others, with a fragmentation of ratification procedures that gives greater space to national choices and debates, relegating European choices and debates to a secondary role.

In the pan-European referendum, citizens will express their views on the new European federal framework, its constituent and foundational rules, and the overcoming of the dimension of the current nation-states. If the preparatory phase is sufficiently inclusive and effective, an electorate will be called upon to express itself, which will then be more consciously "European."

The objective, the explicit goal of the next reform, can only be a European federation: not a centralized super-state, but a federal community capable of effectively exercising those competencies that surpass the governance capacity of the individual state.

VII. The Future of Europe as Written by the Youth

The European elections of 2024 are shaping up to be a milestone in the continent's evolutionary path, offering an opportunity to shape the European destiny. In this crucial scenario, the active and influential role of young people emerges as a cornerstone: their

active participation is essential to ensure that European institutions reflect the real needs of the new generations.

The voice of young people must resonate in the institutional corridors, shaping policies and initiatives that address the challenges of contemporary times. The distinctive element of the contribution of the new generations lies precisely in their innovative perspective. The climate crisis, accelerated digitalization, and social challenges require bold and progressive solutions. Therefore, it is the young people, with their natural inclination towards innovation and technology, who are in a privileged position to lead Europe towards a more sustainable and future-oriented society.

However, a new way of thinking about activism is needed to tap into the willingness of tomorrow's Europeans to engage, focusing on the radicality of a struggle capable of restoring the perception of making a better future a reality. We are not just talking about the "Erasmus generation," as the Europeanization of study and work paths concerns a minority share of students, a label that conveys superficial Europeanization if not accompanied by a process of empowerment.

This process, rather than a European identity based on cosmopolitan principles (capable, that is, of generating a cultural transformation and loyalties), risks shaping only a widespread "banal cosmopolitanism," starring a "bored generation." The cosmopolitanism of European travels with low-cost flights, the sharing of symbols and forms of consumption, ethnic dinners. A patina of superficial, deterritorialized and depoliticized identity that can be conceived as an intermediate form of belonging that develops between a cosmopolitan elite and a significant part of Europeans confined to the local dimension. Instead, young people have an interest in this struggle on the plane of duty, not just of right, as it is the definition of their future that concerns politics (in general) and these processes (in particular).

In view of the European elections, it is necessary to overturn the idea that young people are increasingly seen as an additional burden on society, excluded from any discourse on the promise of a better future. They are often considered part of a disposable population, whose presence threatens to recall suppressed collective memories of adults' responsibility.

Yet, in history, there are no revolutions, nor progressive societies, without an active and central role for young people.

Today's Europe has lost its idealism because it is no longer "a promise," but an existing and factual power (often a scapegoat for the damage of national policies), albeit with all the limitations thereof.

On one hand, a new democratic order must be proposed at the supranational level based on the principles of "justice and freedom," rejecting the "heart of darkness" of our past and materializing in the birth of a true political union.

On the other hand, a commitment to save European civilization involves defining a path of redemption for the marginalized or those on the peripheries: a new social pact after the failed one between citizens and the national state.

For European democracy to thrive, it is essential to ensure that the voices of young people are heard and that their concerns are effectively addressed at the political level. The active involvement of the new generations not only enriches the political landscape with new perspectives but also contributes to building a more inclusive and responsible society. In this way, young people can become protagonists in a future that reflects the aspirations of all.

I. Federalism and Minorities

As long as the legitimacy of political power is based on the coincidence between state and nation, the mere existence of one or more groups that do not have the characteristics (linguistic, religious, ethnic, gender-related, etc.) by which the identity of the dominant nation is defined constitutes a negation of the legitimacy of the state.

Nationalist ideology imposes a unitary culture through mythical symbols that lead to the coincidence of citizenship with belonging to a national community considered homogeneous in a fictitious way in its absolutized values.

The "imagined" cultural homogeneity thus falls within the unrealistic and artificial dystopia to which chauvinism inevitably tends: an attitude of conservation, of full adherence to a tradition reinvented according to the needs of contingent politics.

Linking the sense of belonging to the need to identify with the nation has led to an expansion of the state beyond the public sphere, to invade the private sphere of ethnocultural choices (to ensure the internalization by citizens of national ideology) with consequences on the model of family perceived as "traditional" or defining gender roles regardless of individuals' rights to self-determination. This conception leads to a spiral of violence with no way out and to identity exclusivism (or integralism), which in its extreme forms imposes the forced inclusion or exclusion of the "others" (people, groups, languages, cultures, religions, etc.). This can occur on one hand through imposed and often violent assimilation, on the other hand through marginalization, discrimination, violence, expulsion from the territory, or even extermination (which involves denying the humanity of the other).

Ethnic integralism always produces friction and conflicts: the more statism is linked to the affirmation of ethnic or national objectives, the more dangerous the consequences will be. Those who are aware of how dangerous every temptation of ethnic exclusivism is must work on positive policies of coexistence, inclusion, intersectionality, and interculturality: this will be one of the main challenges of the near future, and this will be one of the decisive parameters by which states, political structures, and even the goals and initiatives of civil society must be measured.

At the centre of every social conflict, we always find "exclusion and oppression"; for this reason, they are indissolubly linked to the struggle for the economic, political, cultural,

creative, and ideal autonomy of the individual. Merely proclaiming equality is not enough; specific rules must be flexible enough to protect differences, and the territorial dimension must be valued more than the ethnic or national dimension: the common bond that unites cohabiting people on the same territory constitutes a connection with it and among the generations that succeed each other.

Globalization, by deterritorialising relations between communities, poses the problem of democratizing international organizations (to which an increasing number of functions are transferred) that oversee relations between states and that of overcoming the political division of humanity into sovereign states. Governments are unable to counter the negative repercussions of globalization without world government; hence, the assertion of a political demand for ethnic-national or even regional closure. Federalism could solve the problems we have mentioned, as a simultaneous shift of powers and competences downwards and upwards. Downward, through strengthening local autonomy and self-government, and upwards through the construction of supranational authorities and legal systems.

In a completed federal state, minorities should be guaranteed by the institutions, while citizens' political opinions would no longer be imposed by their belonging to a community. It is the choice to be part of that common collective and to decide together the rules that is a fundamental aspect.

In a Europe rich in cultural, ethnic, and social diversity, the promotion of solidarity and inclusion emerges as an imperative priority for building a fair and harmonious society. In this context, young people are called to play a fundamental role in countering discrimination, promoting diversity, and working together towards a future of justice and inclusivity. Diversity is one of Europe's distinctive strengths, enriching the continent with a variety of perspectives, traditions, and stories. If supported by a shared European educational system, young people are in an ideal position to break down cultural barriers and promote intercultural dialogue that celebrates differences rather than divides them.

Promoting diversity is not just a matter of tolerance but a driver of growth and prosperity. Inclusive environments must be created in workplaces, educational institutions, and local communities, encouraging the participation of all, and fostering harmonious coexistence. Through education and awareness-raising, a society must be created in which everyone is respected for their uniqueness. Working towards a fairer and more inclusive society requires long-term commitment. Young people can be catalysts for change, using their energy and passion to address injustices and promote a sense of community that embraces diversity.

In conclusion, the recognition of forms of autonomy, institutional guarantees of adequate pluralism, and the defence of minorities or oppressed groups are fundamental elements in defining the type of society we live in. Ethnical exclusivism or a policy of coexistence and intersecular inclusion: this is the alternative to be posed, and here is a litmus test to verify an important aspect of the quality of institutions and political movements.

II. Europe in Times of Conflict

The issue of federalism in Europe takes on crucial significance considering conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Creating an integrated approach to cooperation and shared sovereignty can be an effective response to address such regional challenges and build a solid foundation for the future of the European Union.

Firstly, the European Union should intensify diplomatic efforts and promote a common foreign policy. Federal cooperation can facilitate a unified response to crises, providing stronger tools for conflict management and sending clear signals about the European position. Establishing a central diplomatic authority could enable a quicker and more effective response to emergencies, promoting stability in neighbouring regions.

Secondly, it is crucial to strengthen European collective security. A federal European Union could build a common defence system, ensuring protection of borders and management of common threats. Increasing military cooperation and shared resources could help deter potential aggressions and strengthen stability in Europe.

A third crucial aspect is the promotion of European values in neighbouring regions. The European Union should invest in cultural diplomacy and economic cooperation to support democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Promoting these values could help mitigate tensions and stabilize conflict-affected areas.

III. Necessary reforms

To move beyond the realm of utopia, European parties will need to advance the process of unification towards federal development to have decision-making capacity that allows for the promotion of effective and impactful policies on society.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has made it even more urgent for international peace to have a Europe equipped with the tools to autonomously conduct its own foreign and security policy aimed at safeguarding human rights and stabilizing neighbouring areas.

To be credible in this phase, it will need to equip itself as soon as possible with a unique defence in service of the UN and the international order according to the model of a dual army. It will be necessary to ensure security through enhanced collaboration with African Union institutions and support an African Green Deal so that sustainable growth can finally be achieved.

The value system supporting the social model has a global dimension, as it must not only overcome inequalities in income distribution within Europe but also at the supranational level. In this perspective, Altiero Spinelli had already affirmed the need to link growth in Europe to the revival of demand in the countries of the Global South through a new Marshall Plan.

Obviously, there will be no room to maintain migration policies based on securitization and externalization if one wants to have an international projection based on the

cosmopolitan ideal. Institutions are needed to build real solidarity: competences in these key areas must be removed from the veto and blackmail power of individual countries and assigned at the European level. If there is to be a European policy for integration, asylum, and migration (accompanied by a real foreign and fiscal policy), then true solidarity can be introduced, moving away from the securitarian paradigm of migration, and starting to think about it holistically.

For a long time, we should have foreseen a new sea rescue action along the lines of "Mare Nostrum"; to review the framework of European immigration policy, overcoming the differences between those fleeing wars or other tragedies because they all kill in the same way. Thus, in addition to a radical reform of institutions in a federal direction, of migration policies, intersectoral inclusion, and reception, one could rethink an industrial policy and a welfare system on a continental basis capable of guaranteeing development, competition, and continuity of social rights regardless of the precariousness of individual conditions, directly transferring labour rights to the individual.

The drastic increases in productivity brought about by the technological revolution must be offset by a reduction in working hours and a constant increase in wages, to ensure an equitable distribution of the fruits of this progress. To limit the contraction of employment in the market sector of the economy, special attention will be needed to the third sector, i.e., the non-market economy.

Therefore, in addition to the completion of the basic income proposed by Piketty for those with too low wages, one perspective could be a "European" citizenship income that remunerates those who decide to perform "civic engagement" work, as imagined also by Bauman, Beck, and many others. This type of work would have great economic significance, offering new professional outlets to a workforce that cannot find employment, but also profound ethical and political significance. It is work based on a spontaneous decision of individuals and linked to projects of social utility, under the direction of an entrepreneur who organizes an activity aimed at promoting the common good.

As an example, to support a social life built on solidarity relationships, it would be appropriate to recover Ernesto Rossi's idea of providing private goods and essential public services free of charge for a dignified life through the performances of a "labour army". Rossi made this proposal after noting that a policy to overcome poverty cannot be financed solely through the tax system, making it mandatory for young people to provide this service to the community for a certain period of time: with their work, "they should provide, in addition to their maintenance, for the maintenance of all people who apply for it and for the provision of other free public services". Only in this way "would the state assistance lose that humiliating character of charity it has always had so far" and would make "the relationships of solidarity that bind individuals to other members of the civil consortium more immediate" felt, ensuring that "everyone would bear an equal share of the cost of public services for the benefit of the community".

This new form of compulsory civil service would differ from the current one in the purpose it intends to pursue, which is to provide exclusively to those who find

themselves in a situation of discomfort goods and services to have a dignified life. The proposal to require new generations to devote a part of their work activity either to serving their community or to an international cooperation commitment should promote "overcoming a selfish view of the world" and the development of "deep feelings of solidarity". The European Union could become the laboratory of a new democracy, the social and political space in which to experiment with the deliberative model inspired by cosmopolitan orientations, (since there are potential political, institutional, social, and cultural requirements), also identifying ways to give a central role to young people, thus founding the democratic process on a dialogue between present and future.

IV. Representing the youth: the European Youth Council

It is crucial to make participation a permanent tool, ensuring that young people are involved in decision-making processes and that their consultation is an active part in defining national and European policies, becoming mandatory and not just optional. Young people must become representatives and represented to promote a new model of governance and to change the current *modus operandi* of national and European institutions in decision-making processes.

Why not consider redefining the current legislative *modus operandi* with the creation of a European Youth Council to ensure meaningful participation and authentic representation of young people in the decision-making process of the European Union?

This body could consolidate the voice of young Europeans, offering a dedicated platform to express opinions, propose solutions, and influence policies that shape their future.

The European Youth Council should be structured to reflect the cultural, social, and economic diversity of the continent. Young people from different regions and backgrounds should have the opportunity to participate actively, thus ensuring inclusive representation that considers the multiple youth perspectives.

The Council would be tasked with discussing and formulating recommendations on youth policies, covering a wide range of topics, including education, employment, environment, human rights, and social welfare. Recommendations should be presented to the decision-making bodies of the European Union, thus providing input capable of ensuring intergenerational solidarity.

For the Council to become an effective institutional body, it is essential for European authorities to commit significant resources to support its activities and initiatives. This includes promoting events, conferences, and educational programs that allow young people to inform themselves, engage in dialogue, and develop leadership skills.

Furthermore, it is crucial to establish effective communication channels between the Council and European institutions, ensuring that the recommendations and opinions of young people are taken seriously during the decision-making process. This would

promote the creation of more inclusive policies that respond to the needs of future generations.

In summary, the creation of a European Youth Council, institutionalizing the European Youth Forum and structured dialogue, would represent a significant step towards institutionalizing youth participation in the European decision-making process. By providing a dedicated platform and investing in the voices and ideas of young people, the European Union could build a lasting bridge between generations and promote active engagement in the continent's future.

V. Conclusions

The destiny of Europe is decided at its borders: to the East, in the peripheries, and in the Mediterranean. Time is a crucial factor in terms of integration; failing to make rapid advancements in institutional and policy matters risks delaying enlargement (given the situation at the borders of Ukraine and in the Balkans) and, indeed, triggering further divisive factors that are difficult to manage. Following the path of these reforms could lead to thinking again in terms of a community to believe in, based on the idea of constitutional patriotism.

Europe, a continent rich in history, culture, and diversity, faces a constant challenge: how to manage the complexity of its sovereign nations in an increasingly interconnected world. One answer to this challenge is represented by federalism, a political and institutional approach that proposes the sharing of power between a central government and local or regional entities.

Citizen participation is essential to ensure the legitimacy of European institutions. The creation of advisory bodies or the possibility of referendums on crucial issues could be implemented to actively engage the population and promote a sense of common belonging.

The task we want to give ourselves as young Europeans is to provide a systemic response to nationalist "retrotopias," to those who preach a return to the past by scapegoating the European Union.

The involvement of young people helps the community fully understand what it means to grow up in a rapidly changing world. According to the sustainable perspective of human development, young people are agents of their own development. Rather than being passive recipients of external influences, they are actively involved in shaping tomorrow, interacting with the people and opportunities available in their environments.

Young people have the right to represent their interests. Communities benefit from improving the quality of life, coordinating services, and authentically embracing diversity by representing young people.

The awareness of moving forward in European integration and overcoming obstacles posed by the modus operandi of national governments and the Union must also come from young people. Their role is twofold:

- They must directly understand the *raison d'être* of the European integration project, the activities of the European Union, and its way of operating in civil society, as well as the opportunities offered to young people.
- They must advocate to ensure that the European leadership and civil society can collaborate and ensure that the new generations have effective representation in shaping both national and community governance. Specifically, they should champion a project for coordinating and representing youth interests.

As stated in the Ventotene Manifesto:

"Today is the moment when one must know how to cast aside old burdens that have become cumbersome, be ready for the new that comes so different from everything that was imagined, discard the ineffective among the old, and stir up new energies among the young. Today, those who have discerned the reasons for the current crisis of European civilization are sought and encountered, beginning to weave the fabric of the future. They inherit the legacy of all movements aimed at elevating humanity, which foundered due to a lack of understanding of the goal to be achieved or the means to achieve it."

In anticipation of the European elections, it is essential to engage in an open and engaging dialogue with citizens to ensure that the decisions made fully reflect the longing for the future of the younger generations.

VIII. THE PRIORITIES OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT ITALY IN SUMMARY

We are convinced that it is necessary to create a European public space animated by the principles of parliamentary and participatory democracy, namely through a stable alliance between the major European political forces and representative organizations of civil society to ensure respect for the rule of law in its essential elements: the supremacy of law, the right to have rights, non-discrimination, the separation of powers, and sanctions against the abuse of power.

We believe that a more integrated Europe must safeguard and enhance cultural diversity starting from cities, within the framework of the multilevel identity characterizing the European model, because it is at the local level that cohesion and integration succeed or fail.

We commit to fighting to ensure the right to asylum and the reception of those fleeing from wars, political persecution, hunger, environmental disasters, and land exploitation, within the framework of a genuine inclusion policy involving all Member States and local communities. We also advocate for the renewal and strengthening of cooperation policies with the Mediterranean and Africa through a European investment plan based on public-private partnership, and for the governance of migratory flows with supranational measures and instruments, intensifying the involvement of trade unions and business organizations together with volunteering and NGOs.

We demand that the right to external security be guaranteed, progressing towards a progressive integration of national military instruments in the service of peacebuilding and maintenance, and a common foreign policy. We also call for the guarantee of internal security, strengthening the fight against organized crime, corruption, and transnational terrorism, laying the groundwork for a European criminal law, strengthening the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, and creating a common intelligence agency in full respect of the prerogatives of the European Parliament and national parliaments.

We are convinced that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be equipped with an economic government based on political institutions of a democratic nature: overcoming the distinction between supranational monetary policy, intergovernmental economic policies, and national social policies, respecting the principle that the euro is the currency of the entire European Union with the obligation for all Member States to adopt it, and creating political and financial instruments to ensure shared prosperity.

We call for the adoption of a multiannual budget with a five-year deadline, annually tailored to short-term needs, based on fiscal capacity independent of national budgets and equipped with true own resources, strengthened by loans and mortgages to ensure innovative long-term investments, and endowed with the necessary amount to ensure European-sized public goods to citizens.

We demand the approval of a new European Green and Social Deal based on effective measures to promote convergence between Member States, reduce inequalities between regions and citizens with a strong European cohesion policy, and create a European welfare system, giving full and binding implementation to the Social Plan and creating the conditions for a renewed social dialogue as a defining element of economic democracy.

We are convinced that industrial, technological, and scientific policy should be a model for ecological transition, considering its productive fabric composed of SMEs and fully implementing the sustainable development goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015 with the Agenda 2030.

We call for the creation of a genuine European federal citizenship, endowed with an autonomous core of individual and collective rights, civil, political, economic, and social based on the Charter of Rights and reinforced by adherence to the revised Turin Social Charter.

We demand that the next legislature be dedicated to a constituent process of a united, solidary, and democratic Europe based on a Fundamental Law that is democratically approved through a pan-European referendum among the peoples and States that wish it, and for this reason, we will ask candidates to endorse a personal commitment accompanied by the decision, if elected, to choose the European Parliament, renouncing national, regional, or local offices.

Appendix

Manifesto for the European Elections 2024 European Movement International

INTRODUCTION

Ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the European Movement International (EMI) presents key recommendations to address current EU challenges and enhance its democracy.

The upcoming European elections present an opportunity to advance the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) outcomes. Policies implementing CoFoE's recommendations should be included in candidates' campaigns and the priorities of new MEPs and the European Commission.

Concurrently, EU Treaty reforms are necessary to enhance democratic function, address citizen challenges, and prepare for new EU members.

These recommendations reflect inputs from 75 organizations across over 30 countries.

DEMOCRACY, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES

1. Include rule of law safeguards in all legislation to ensure the enforceability of the EU Treaties and their provisions and implement a "democracy watchdog" with a mandate to routinely monitor the situation of the rule of law in all EU Member States.
2. Keep fighting to ensure media freedom and pluralism all over the EU and beyond, while countering foreign interference and disinformation and ensuring free and fair elections all over Europe.
3. Formalise the role of citizens' panels and strengthen participatory democracy as a complement to representative democracy.
4. Create a European constituency and implement a new EU electoral law to promote greater participation; this should include the full implementation of the Spitzenkandidaten process, the lowering of the voting age and the creation of transnational voting lists.
5. Enhance the representation of underrepresented groups, such as women, young people, ethnic and religious minorities and the LBTQIA+ community, and ensure they are involved in the decision-making process.

A SOCIAL, SUSTAINABLE, CREATIVE AND PROSPEROUS EUROPE

1. Accelerate the green transition, while making sure that it is fair and inclusive, through the successful implementation of the European Green Deal and the Fit

for 55 package, along with the Paris Agreement, in close conjunction with an ambitious implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals.

2. Further promote the democratisation of technology to boost the digital transition while making sure to guarantee citizens' fundamental rights online and environmental standards along with promoting fair competition and innovation.
3. Increase investment in the most up-to-date technical skills to adjust to labour market transitions following the green and digital transition, while transforming our current economy into a wellbeing economy.
4. Coordinate efforts to strengthen workers' rights while supporting those left out of the labour market. New measures such as a European unemployment insurance and a European employment contract can help bring workers' rights in Europe to the same standards.
5. Support culture and cultural heritage as key assets for the future of the European project and especially as a vector for fostering a sense of belonging and a sense of togetherness in Europe, as well as for advancing Europe's shared values and identity.

EUROPE AND THE WORLD

1. Continue to push back Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and to keep the sanctions active as long as the invasion continues, including support for the post-war reconstruction and social rehabilitation in view of the country's accession to the EU.
2. Cognisant of different Member States' positions on security and defence, build a fully-fledged European Defence Union (EDU) by enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy with common training of the armed forces of EU Member States, developing cyber capacities, and increasing defence spending and joint defence procurements by Member States.
3. Increase investment in the most up-to-date technical skills to adjust to labour market transitions following the green and digital transition, while transforming our current economy into a wellbeing economy.
4. Further enhance the EU's external relations, in particular EU-US relations, EU-Asia relations, EU-Africa relations and EU-Latin America relations by making a priority the protection of democracy, enhancement of human rights and the fight against the climate crisis, as well as the promotion of trade.
5. Ensure a migration and asylum policy based on dignity and respect of fundamental human rights and on the open nature of the EU, avoiding a "Fortress Europe", and by strengthening cooperation with countries of origin in Africa and beyond.

ANNEXES

The "GREEN BOOK - Let's write the future of Europe together. A Project, a Method, and a Constituent Agenda for the Tenth Legislature 2024-2029" is completed by a series of documents collected in a **second volume** which is only available in electronic format on the web.

It contains the following types of documents:

- Institutional texts on the topic of EU reforms
- Posters/programmes of European political groups/political parties
- Other posters for the 2024 European elections
- Contributions from the collective members of the European Movement - Italy
- Contributions of the Members of the Assembly of the European Movement - Italy
- Other relevant documents

To access this documentation

<https://movimentoeuropeo.it/pages/progetti-in-fase-di-realizzazione/2842-libro-verde-scriviamo-insieme-il-futuro-dell-europa>)



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